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Crown Jewel Obligation and its Defense on Sustaining Competitive Equilibrium

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Davit Basiashvili

Doctor of Economics (PhD), Professor

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Slava Fetelava

Doctor of Economics (PhD), Associate Professor at Grigol Robakidze University

Abstract

The paper deals with the practical aspects of the use of crown jewel obligations and the crown jewel defense in ongoing mergers and acquisitions, with the aim of maintaining equilibrium and a healthy competitive environment, protecting consumers, and preventing monopolistic practices or other types of anti-competitive behavior.

It explains that a crown jewel encompasses the most strategically important and valuable assets of an economic entity—assets that play a crucial role in shaping market positioning and significantly impact the profitability of an incumbent firm’s business.

While the study devotes significant attention to European Commission and the USA mergers and acquisitions regulations and the role of crown jewel obligation in this transections, the practical steps of the targeted companies to curb and avoid hostile takeover is described. Article provides the European Commission decisions and U.S. Department of Justice rulings concerning major corporate mergers, particularly those involving crown jewel obligations and hostile takeover litigation.

Keywords: Crown Jewel Obligation, Crown Jewel Defense, Merger, Acquisition, Divestiture, Hostile Takeover, Up-Front Buyer, Strategic Assets, Stakeholders, Stocks, Board of Directors.

References

  1. https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wpcontent/uploads/2016/10/Europe-Column-October-Full.pdf
  2. Council regulation (EC) no 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings - the EC Merger Regulation)
  3. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-90/pdf/STATUTE-90-Pg1383.pdf
  4. https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/antitrust/magazine/2024/vol-39-issue-1/new-era-hart-scott-rodino.pdf
  5. Council regulation (EC) no 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings - the EC Merger Regulation)
  6. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-90/pdf/STATUTE-90-Pg1383.pdf
  7. https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/antitrust/magazine/2024/vol-39-issue-1/new-era-hart-scott-rodino.pdf
  8. https://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases1/202322/M_10721_9208023_1695_3.pdf
  9. Joseph Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Preliminary Injunctions in Hostile Tender Offers, Reprinted from Kansas Law Review Vol. 30, No.4, Summer, 1982, p 492
  10. https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/poisonpill.asp
  11. https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/valuation/pac-man-defense-hostile-tekeover/
  12. Case M.10721 - Celanese / Dupont (mobility & materials business)
  13. Hilton Hotels Corp. v. ITT Corp., 978 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Nev. 1997)
  14. Order №39 of the Chairman of the Competition Agency26 October, 2020 Tbilisi, Georgia, On the Approval of the Rule of Submitting and Reviewing Concentration

The new Economist, No3, 2025, Vol. 20, Issue 3.

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Published Date:

11/10/2025

Article Views: 89